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Auction theory represents one of the richest areas of research in economics over the past three decades.
Yet, whether, and to what extent, the introduction of secondary resale markets influences bidding
behavior in sealed bid first-price auctions remains under researched.  This study begins by examining
field data from a unique data set that includes nearly 3,000 auctions (over 10,000 individual bids) for
cutting rights of standing timber in British Columbia from 1996-2000.  In comparing bidding patterns
across agents who are likely to have resale opportunities with those who likely do not, we find evidence
that is consistent with theory.  Critical evaluation of the reduced-form bidding model, however, reveals
that sharp tests of the theoretical predictions are not possible because several other differences may
exist across these bidder types.  We therefore use a laboratory experiment to examine if the resale
opportunity by itself can have the predicted theoretical effect.  We find that while it does have the
predicted effect, a theoretical model based on risk-averse bidders explains the overall data patterns
more accurately than a model based on risk-neutral bidders.  Beyond testing theory, the paper highlights
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mprice21@utk.eduI.  Introduction 
Auctions have a long and storied history.  From the human slave auctions carried out in 
ancient Egypt to the marriage auctions for brides in Asia Minor to the Praetorian Guard 
auctioning off the Roman Empire in A.D. 193, auctions have been used to allocate goods and 
services.  While auctions have certainly served an important purpose throughout the history of 
mankind and are now used to sell almost anything one can imagine – vintage wines, Treasury 
bills, pollution permits, baseball cards, etc. – economists have only recently begun to explore 
rigorously the theoretical underpinnings of various auction formats (see Klemperer (1999) for a 
nice review).   
A recent set of studies in the literature explores cases when individual valuations are not 
known with certainty at the time of the auction.
1  Haile’s (2003) work goes a step further by 
introducing secondary (resale) markets, creating an environment that represents many naturally-
occurring settings:  U.S. Forest Service timber auctions, the procurement of governmental 
contracts, estate auctions, art auctions, FCC auctions and the like all fit in this general class of 
allocation mechanisms.
2  Unlike the traditional auction literature that assumes independent 
private values (IPV) that are known with certainty, when bidders have ex ante uncertainty about 
independent private values and anticipate resale opportunities, equilibrium bidding strategies are 
dependent upon option values conveyed from the secondary market.  Intuitively, bidder behavior 
in this case is linked to the existence and structure of potential resale markets.   
                                                 
1 For example, it is well established in the literature that when bidders receive multi-dimensional or uncertain 
signals, auctions may generate inefficient allocations (Pesendorfer and Swinkels (2000), Jehiel and Moldovanu 
(2001), Goeree and Offerman (2003)).  Efficiency and bidding strategies in such an environment are dependent upon 
the weight individual bidders assign to both the private and common value components of a signal and upon the 
number of participants in a given market.  Other studies that relax the assumption of known valuations include the 
work of Schwarz and Sonin (2004) and Haile (2000).   
2 There is a growing theoretical literature that examines the impacts of such resale opportunities on bidder behavior 
and a seller’s optimal choice of auction format (see, for example, Bikhchandani and Huang (1989), Gupta and 
Lebrun (1999), and Garratt and Troger (2006)).  Experimentally the impact of resale opportunities on bidder 
behavior has been examined in the context of English auctions (Georganas, 2009) and in auctions with asymmetric 
bidders (Georganas and Kagel, 2009).   Our study attempts to make empirical advances in this area.  The empirical investigation 
begins by making use of naturally-occurring data drawn from nearly 3,000 timber auctions (over 
10,000 individual bids) from the Small Business Forest Enterprise Program (SBFEP) for the 
interior region of British Columbia (BC) for the period 1996-2000.  While our results are 
consonant with theory, a number of caveats and strong assumptions are necessary to identify the 
resale effect under our reduced-form modeling approach.   
One way to approach this quandary is to make use of a laboratory experiment.  By 
studying artificial markets that differ only in whether a secondary market is available, we are 
permitted a unique glimpse into whether the resale market by itself can lead to such predicted 
consequences.  Keeping an eye toward designing a laboratory setting that resembles naturally 
occurring markets while maintaining a strong theoretical link, we designed an experiment using 
the first-price auction with both a second stage optimal auction (OA) as well as an English 
auction (EA) continuation game of complete information.
3  Given that this is the first controlled 
experimental test in this area, our approach of using the extremes for the division of surplus on 
the secondary market is apropos since it allows a controlled test of existing theory and provides a 
useful benchmark for making inference from field data. 
The lab results are broadly in line with theoretical predictions.  First, we find that 
experimental subjects submit bids that are significantly higher in markets with resale organized 
by an optimal auction than in those without such opportunity (or with secondary markets 
organized by an EA).  This result is intuitively appealing as one would expect subjects to bid 
more aggressively when winning an auction is more valuable.  Second, we find differences in 
                                                 
3 Our use of the optimal and English auction terminology follows Haile (2003) and reflects the extremes for the 
division of surplus on the secondary market.  Under an OA continuation game, the resale seller receives maximal 
gains from secondary market trade.  In contrast, the resale buyer receives maximal gains under the EA continuation 
game.   baseline bids and those in our EA treatment that are consonant with theory: over lower (higher) 
ranges of the signal space bids in the EA treatment are greater than (less than) those submitted in 
our baseline no resale markets.  This comparison represents a demanding test of theory, as it 
requires subjects to recognize and consider differences in the option values conveyed by resale 
over the signal space.  Finally, an interesting data pattern not anticipated by extant theory is that 
over lower ranges of the signal space, realized bids are less than the risk-neutral theoretical 
predictions, while over higher ranges of the signal space, realized bids are greater than the risk-
neutral theoretical predictions.  Yet, these tendencies are consonant with a theory with risk-
averse bidders.     
We view our study as contributing to our understanding of the effect of adding resale 
opportunities to auctions, and more generally furthering our knowledge concerning how 
secondary market structure affects bidder behavior.  In addition, the study provides empirical 
evidence of behavior in such markets that can aid in the design and implementation of efficient 
mechanisms for the allocation of goods and services.  Methodologically, our paper showcases the 
benefits of combining lab and field data to test economic theory and provide policy advice.   
The remainder of the paper is crafted as follows.  Section II provides an overview of the 
SBFEP auction market and our strategy for identifying resale differences using reduced-form bid 
functions.  Section III discusses the laboratory experiment and results.  Section IV concludes.  
II. The SBFEP Auction Market 
The SBFEP Auction – Background and Predictions 
Our naturally occurring data are drawn from nearly 3,000 timber auctions (over 10,000 
individual bids) from the Small Business Forest Enterprise Program for the interior region of 
British Columbia for the period 1996-2000.  During our sample period, SBFEP auctions in BC were used to allocate standing timber of less than 50,000 metric board feet cubed (mb
3) to small 
logging companies and contractors.  These auctions are subdivided into two types: Category 1 
and Category 2, where Category 1 auctions include only market loggers.  Category 2 auctions are 
open to both registered market loggers and registered owners of processing facilities.  
  Category 1 bidders purchase timber cutting rights and sell harvested timber to end users.  
In the interior of BC almost all harvested timber is sold to either major forest license holders or 
local sawmills.  Ex ante, bidders contract with a prospective buyer to arrange an agreement in 
principle to sell/buy if they win the auction.  The bidders then submit bids and the winner 
consummates the agreement in principle and chooses to lock in the stumpage price he bid.   
Category 2 bidders purchase timber cutting rights to obtain raw materials for their processing 
operations.  Bidders either process harvested timber or trade it to obtain needed materials.
 4    
Since processing facilities are actively engaged in the ex post buying and selling of 
harvested logs whereas loggers contract ex ante to deliver all harvest to a given buyer, resale 
might enter into the bidding strategies of the former but not the latter.  Intuitively, since 
processing facilities have an outside option to sell logs on a spot market whereas loggers do not 
have such an option, one would expect that processing facilities would provide an upper 
envelope on the observed bids of loggers from the interior.  To identify whether this effect holds, 
we rely upon cross sectional variation.
5 
Identifying Resale Effects from Reduced-Form Bid Functions 
                                                 
4 Throughout the empirical analysis we assume that firms are symmetric.  Since participation in the SBFEP is 
limited to loggers who do not own processing facilities and small sawmills, bidder asymmetry is less likely than in 
timber auctions in the United States (see e.g.,  Athey et al., 2004).  Our identification strategy relies upon the 
symmetry assumption, and we should note that models which allow bidder asymmetry may generate different 
comparative static results.   
5 In this sense, our identification strategy is much different from Haile (2001), who analyzes individual bids from 
the U.S. timber auctions and makes use of the temporal variation in the imposition of federal regulations by 
examining bids prior to the onset of the regulations that effectively prohibited resale and comparing them to bids 
after the regulations took effect.   Haile (2003) highlights two opposing effects of resale on bidder valuations and hence 
strategies – the resale seller effect (the option value of selling in the resale market) and the resale 
buyer effect (the option value of buying in the resale market).  Intuitively, whenever the resale 
seller effect dominates, the expected value of winning any auction is a combination of an agent’s 
private use value and the expected profits of selling on the secondary market.  Provided that the 
expected profit of resale is non-zero, this option value leads to higher overall bids.   Given the 
structure of secondary market exchange we expect the resale seller effect to be more pronounced 
amongst Category 2 bidders. 
  To identify this comparative static, we employ a general approach that is in the spirit of, 
for example, Porter and Zona (1993, 1999).  We employ reduced-form methods to infer the 
nature of resale effects by differences in bidding patterns across subsets of firms facing different 
outside options.
6  As the true equilibrium bidding function is unknown in practice, we consider 
two different specifications to approximate observed bidding behavior given by: 
ij ij i ij PX D           ( 1 )  
  10 1 ij i ij i ij ij PD X DX             (1’) 
where Pij is the ith bidder’s total bid in auction j.  Xij is a set of regressors underlying the i
th 
firm’s valuation for tract j, Di is a dummy variable that equals one for any bid placed by a mill in 
a Category 2 auction; ij = i + uij; E[i] = 0, E[i
2] = 
2, E[ik] = 0 for i  k; i and uij are 
orthogonal for all i and j.  i is a random effect assumed to capture heterogeneity that would be 
                                                 
6 An alternate approach to identifying resale effects would be to employ structural methods similar to those 
developed in Laffont et al. (1995) or Guerre et al. (2000).  However, to use these methods, we would have to specify 
the structure of the resale market which is based upon bilateral exchange between mills that is unobserved in our 
data.  Without being able to specify the nature of secondary market exchange, we could not identify the first-order 
conditions defining optimal bids which are fundamental to these structural methods.    left uncontrolled in a standard cross-sectional model and uij represents private information such 
as idiosyncratic shocks to the expected valuation for firm i in auction j.     
Specification (1) indicates that the effect of resale acts only as an intercept shift for mills 
in Category 2 auction, while (1’) permits the resale effect to enter both the slope and intercept 
terms.  Theoretically, if the resale seller effect dominates for Category 2 bids, then we would 
expect that 10 ˆˆ ˆ 0 and     .  In particular, we should observe that the estimated comparative 
static effect of competition (and any other covariate that is positively related with a bidder’s 
private use value) on observed bids is smaller for interior Category 1 auctions than it is for 
otherwise equivalent Category 2 auctions generating predicted bids that are greater for the latter 
subset of auctions.     
The SBFEP Auction Data - Empirical Results 
We observe 2,671 SBFEP sealed-bid tender first-price auctions conducted in the interior 
of British Columbia for the period January 1996 through December 2002.
7  These auctions 
provide more than 10,000 individual bids, from which we eliminate any bids submitted in 
auctions with only a single bidder, any bids submitted in an auction with an estimated net cruise 
volume of less than 1,000 m
3, any bids submitted in an auction employing a format other than a 
first-price sealed tender, and any bids submitted by a bidder that participates in both Category 1 
and Category 2 auctions.  This results in a sample of nearly 1,250 firms that submit nearly 5,500 
bids.     
To generate the data for the empirical model, we combine information from a number of 
sources.  First, a list of all bidders currently registered to participate in SBFEP timber auctions 
                                                 
7 This is the identical data set that BC is using to test a new pricing approach under the changed circumstance 
agreement for the U.S.-Canadian softwood lumber dispute.  See List, Millimet, and Price (2008) for a more detailed 
discussion of the trade dispute and the new pricing approach. was provided by the Ministry of Forests (MOF) in BC.  This listing was used to generate unique 
identification codes for each bidder in the data set.  Second, the MOF provided bid sheets for 
each auction that provides information on (i) the regional office holding and date of the auction, 
(ii) the estimated net cruise volume of timber on the plot, (iii) the announced upset rate for the 
auction, and (iv) the identity and bonus bid per m
3 for each participant in the auction.  Finally, 
the MOF provided a database that contains detailed information on the characteristics of each 
plot and the required deadline to complete the harvest of the specified timber.  Table 1 
summarizes these data.     
To condition behavior on observed auction characteristics in tests for resale effects, we 
estimate a series of reduced-form bid functions.  Specifically, we assume that equilibrium 
bidding behavior follows the linear specification in equation (1), and therefore estimate   
ij ij ij X P     ,                       (2) 
where all variables are as defined above.  Auction covariates included in the vector of regressors 
include: 
  UPSET RATE: announced reservation price per m
3 
  NCV: estimated net cruise volume (divided by 1000) 
  VPH: estimated volume of trees per hectare (divided by 1000) 
  LNVPT: log of estimated volume per tree 
  LSPI: the average selling price index for timber harvested 
  DC: deflated development costs (divided by NCV) 
  SLOPE: weighted average slope 
  BWDN: estimated percent of volume blown down 
  BURN: estimated percent of volume burned   CY: estimated percent of volume to be extracted via cable 
  HP: estimated percent of volume to be extracted via helicopter 
  HORSE: estimated percent of volume to be extracted via horse 
  UTIL: estimated capacity utilization for firm i – ratio of current backlog of timber 
contracts in m
3 to maximum backlog of timber contracts in m3 
  CYCLE: estimated cycle time for harvested timber 
  LNB: natural log of the number of bidders. 
  Category 2: indicator variable that equals one for any bidder that only participates in 
Category 2 auctions 
  Distance: The distance in km from the bidder’s city of residence to the center of the 
auctioned plot. 
Table 2 provides parameter estimates for equations (1) and (1’) estimated for different subsets of 
the 5,524 observations.  We should note that the number of bidders in SBFEP auctions is likely 
an endogenous measure.  Taking the number of bidders as an exogenous measure is thus 
somewhat problematic.  However, we are unaware of any method to solve for endogenous entry 
using an instrumental variables approach since n affects bids directly through the level of 
expected competition in the primary auction market and the expected division of surplus on the 
secondary market.      
  Empirical results presented in Table 2 suggest an important difference in the behavior of 
mills versus loggers that are consistent with resale possibilities for the former set of bidders.  
First, the indicator variable for Category 2 bidders (mills) in both columns 1 and 2 suggests that 
such agents submit bids that are ceteris paribus $1.47 - $1.68 greater than those submitted by a 
registered logger in a Category 1 auction with this difference statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level.  Second, measured at the sample means and using parameter estimates from Columns 
4 and 5, the estimated marginal effect of adding an additional bidder in a Category 2 auction is 
$2.11 (4.4% increase in the predicted bid) as opposed to $0.91 (2.01% increase in the predicted 
bid) for a Category 1 auction.   
Equilibrium bidding strategies in auctions with resale are conditioned upon information 
related to other bidders in the market that is absent in the strategy of a firm bidding in a market 
without resale.  Hence, we would expect greater competition in the former case when the 
secondary market institution is an OA continuation game of complete information (or a similar 
analog), as we assume for the Category 2 mills.  This finding is consonant with the predictions 
and analysis employed by Haile (2001).  Combined with other results in Table 2 (e.g., the 
estimated increase in predicted bids for Category 2 auctions), we take the evidence to suggest 
that resale opportunities influence bidding in the direction that theory would predict.  
III.  Experimental Design and Results 
Given the vast number of caveats and assumptions that we must make to our reduced 
form approach, however, we are skeptical that observed differences across bidder types can be 
attributed solely to resale and the possibility of secondary market exchange.
8  This skepticism 
induces us to focus more exclusively on studying artificial markets that differ only in whether a 
secondary market is available.  In doing so, we present a first experiment that examines whether 
the resale market by itself can lead to predicted consequences.   
Experimental Design 
  A total of 90 subjects participated in our laboratory experiment, which was conducted 
during the Fall 2003 and Spring 2004 semesters at the University of Maryland in College Park.  
Each session consisted of two experimental parts: a first-price auction market with or without 
                                                 
8 Yet we should note that we find evidence in line with Haile’s (2001) findings.   resale opportunity and the Holt and Laury (2002) experimental procedure to elicit the risk 
preference of each participant.  Each part of the laboratory experiment is described below.      
Part I: The Auction Market         
Each subject’s experience typically followed four steps: (1) consideration of an invitation 
to participate in an experiment, (2) learning the auction rules, (3) actual market participation, and 
(4) conclusion of the experiment and completion of the Holt and Laury (2002) risk-aversion 
experiment.  In Step 1, undergraduate students from the University of Maryland were recruited 
using e-mail solicitations and flyers hung in academic buildings across the campus.  Once the 
prerequisite number of subjects had responded, a second e-mail was sent to each participant 
inviting them to participate in an experimental session to be held at a given date/time.  After 
subjects were seated in a room, in Step 2 a monitor thoroughly explained the experimental 
instructions and auction rules (included in Appendices A and B).   
Before proceeding, a few key aspects of the experimental design should be highlighted.  
First, all bidders were informed that earnings from the auction experiment would be added to 
earnings from a second, unrelated experiment to determine total earnings for the session.   
Second, individuals were informed that they would be bidders in the experiment.  In each of the 
12 rounds (2 practice and 10 that count towards earnings), they would be given a bidder’s card 
that contained a number, known only to that bidder, representing a signal of the value of one unit 
of the fictitious commodity.  Importantly, all agents were informed that this information was 
strictly private and that both signals and use values would change each round.  They were also 
informed about the number of other bidders in the market (4), that they would bid against the 
same four bidders for all ten rounds, and that agents may have different signals (use values). Third, the monitor explained how signals were determined in each market period and 
how these signals related to the agent’s final reservation (use) value.  Subjects were informed 
that in each period, they would receive a signal from the interval [$0, $50].  These signals were 
determined by adding a random integer generated from a uniform distribution on the interval [-
$10, $10] to the agent’s final use value which was itself an integer value randomly drawn on the 
uniform interval [$10, $40].  Several examples illustrated the relationship between a given use 
value and the range of signals that the bidder could receive in the first stage, and vice versa.                
  Fourth, the monitor explained how earnings were determined.  In the baseline, no resale 
treatment, the highest bidder earns the difference between their end use value and their bid.  All 
other bidders earn zero.  In the resale treatment with OA continuation game, the bidder who 
submits the highest bid earns the difference between the highest use value of all bidders and the 
winning bid.  All other bidders earn zero.  In the resale treatment with EA continuation game, the 
bidder who submits the highest bid receives the maximum of her use value and the second 
highest use value of all participants minus her winning bid.  The bidder who does not submit the 
high bid but has the highest use value receives the difference between this value and the second 
highest use value of all other participants.  All other bidders earn zero for the round.  Total 
earnings for each treatment are computed by summing the earnings across the 10 periods. 
In the resale treatment with OA continuation game, it was publicly announced that 
following the completion of each round, ownership of the good would be sold to the agent with 
the highest use value in the group at a price equal to her value.  In the resale treatment with EA 
continuation game, it was publicly announced that following the completion of each round, 
ownership of the good would be sold to the agent with the highest use value in the group at a price equal to the second highest use value of all agents in the group.
9  In the baseline no-resale 
treatment, several examples were provided that illustrated the irrationality of bidding more than 
$10 above a received signal.  In the resale treatments several examples were provided that 
illustrated the workings of the resale market and how prices for resale exchange and earnings for 
each bidder would be determined.
10  Fifth, individuals participated in 2 practice rounds of 
bidding to gain experience with the auction market and rules.   
  In Step 3, subjects participated in the market.  Each market consisted of 10 rounds of 
bidding that lasted about 3 minutes each.  After each 3-minute period, a monitor privately 
gathered each subject’s bidder card and gave the bidder a second card containing the subject’s 
final use value that was within [-$10, $10] of the original signal.  Once all bidder cards were 
collected, a monitor publicly announced all bids and awarded the good to the highest bidder.  
Final use values were publicly announced and, in the resale treatment, ownership of the 
commodity transferred to the agent with highest use value.   
It should be noted that throughout each session careful attention was given to prohibit 
communications between bidders that could induce collusive outcomes.  Step 4 concluded the 
                                                 
9 Two important features of our experimental design that we should highlight include: i) our choice to limit 
participation on the secondary market to bidders from the primary auction market and ii) our decision to execute 
trades on the secondary market at the theoretical benchmarks for both the OA and EA game of complete 
information.  We elected to limit participation on the secondary market and execute trades at the theoretical 
benchmarks to maintain consistency with our conceptual model.  As a first experimental test, it is apropos to focus 
the analysis on first-stage bidding strategies rather than secondary market exchange.  Allowing the endogenous 
determination of prices on the secondary market would surely have an influence on bidding strategies, as it is likely 
that rents would not be divided on the secondary market as predicated by theory.  Anticipating this, bidders would 
adjust first-stage bidding strategies.  We hope that future work analyzes behavior in markets where prices are 
endogenously determined on the secondary market and new participants are allowed to enter the second-stage 
continuation game. 
10 An important consideration in designing our auction markets was the issue of bankruptcy and bidder behavior.  
Theoretically, bankruptcy was not an issue if subjects played the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium.  However, 
equilibrium payouts in a number of the periods were low enough to raise concern if subjects determined bids with a 
degree of error.  For reasons outlined in Hansen and Lott (1991), we decided to employ an unlimited liability rule 
and allow subjects to have negative earnings for Part I of the experiment.   experiment – after subjects completed the Holt and Laury (2002) experiment (described in Part II 
of this section), they were paid their earnings in private. 
This simple procedure was followed in each of three treatments, which are summarized in 
Table 3.  Table 3 can be read as follows:  row 1, column 2 of Table 3 contains treatment NR, 
denoting a no-resale auction market with 5 bidders, who each have unit demand for the good.  
Table 4 presents buyer induced values and signals for each market period.  All signals were 
drawn and assigned using the following procedure.  We first drew 50 integer numbers on the 
uniform distribution between [$10, $40] using Excel’s random number generator.  We added an 
integer drawn on the uniform distribution [-$10, $10] to this number to obtain signal values.  
These values were then assigned so that unbeknownst to bidders, in each session (i) every bidder 
received the highest signal twice, (ii) each bidder received the highest use value but a lower 
ordered signal, and (iii) resale trade was potentially profitable in half of the periods. 
Part II: The Holt-Laury Risk Experiment 
  Upon completion of Part 1 of the session, instructions and a decision sheet were handed 
out for the second part of the experiment.  This second part was designed to elicit subjects’ risk 
preferences.  In this part of the session, the low-payoff treatment of Holt and Laury (2002) was 
used (see Appendix B for instructions).
11  The treatment is based on ten choices between paired 
lotteries.  The payoff possibilities for Option A, $2.00 or $1.60, are much less variable than those 
for Option B, $3.85 or $0.10, which was considered the risky option.  The odds of winning the 
higher payoff for each of the options increased with each decision, and the paired choices are 
                                                 
11 We elected to use the low-payoff treatment of the Holt and Laury (2002) experiment to measure risk preference 
since the domain of earnings because this treatment [$0.10 to $3.85] approximates the equilibrium domain of per 
period earnings for our auction markets.  We also collected data for a higher-payoff treatment of the Holt and Laury 
(2002) experiment, where the domain of earnings [$0.40 to $15.40] approximates the equilibrium domain of 
earnings at the session level in our auction markets.  In what follows, we report only the empirical results for risk 
preference based upon individual response to the low-payoff Holt and Laury (2002) design.  However, all tests and 
results are robust to the use of response to the higher-payoff experiment.  
 designed to determine degrees of risk aversion.  Holt and Laury (p. 1649) provide a table that 
will be used to categorize subjects’ CARA risk preference levels based on their ten decision 
choices. 
  After the instructions were read and questions were answered, the subjects were asked to 
complete their decision sheets by choosing either A or B for each of the ten decisions.  The 
subjects were instructed that one of the decisions would be randomly selected ex post and used to 
determine their payoffs.  Part of a deck of cards was used to determine payoffs, cards 2-10 and 
the Ace to represent “1”.  After each subject completed his or her decision sheet, a monitor 
would approach the desk and randomly draw a card twice, once to select which of the ten 
decisions to use, and a second time to determine what the payoff was for the option chosen, A or 
B, for the particular decision selected.  After the first card was selected, it was placed back in the 
pile, the deck was reshuffled, and the second card was drawn.  For example, if the first draw was 
an Ace, then the first decision choice would be used.  Suppose the subject selected A in the first 
row.  The second draw would then be made.  If the Ace was drawn, the subject would win $2.00.  
If a card numbered 2-10 was drawn, the subject would win $1.60.  The subjects were aware that 
each decision had an equal chance of being selected.   
  After all the subjects’ payoffs were determined, they combined their payoff from Part 1 
with that of Part 2 to compute their final earnings.  The final payoffs were then verified against 
records maintained by a monitor, and subjects were paid privately in cash for their earnings.  
Each of the sessions lasted approximately 75 minutes and average earnings were roughly $13. 
Theoretical predictions for the laboratory auction markets   
Figure 1 provides theoretical predictions for risk-neutral bidders in our experimental 
markets conditioned on the signal.  Across all but the lowest level of the signal space ($0.00), bidders in markets with resale opportunities represented by an OA continuation game are 
predicted to submit bids that are higher than those submitted by an equivalent bidder in a market 
without resale options.  These differences range from mere pennies for signals less than $5.00 to 
a maximum of about $3.40 for bids submitted in the signal range around $23.
12  For signal 
ranges above $40.00 or below $20, the predicted differences in bids between the no-resale and 
resale treatments are less than $2.75.   
In resale treatments represented by an EA continuation game, risk-neutral bidders are 
predicted to submit bids that are on average higher than those submitted by an equivalent bidder 
in a market without resale at ranges of our signal space of less than $27.00.  For signals larger 
than $27.00, risk-neutral bidders in our resale treatment with EA continuation game are predicted 
to submit bids that are on average less than those submitted by an equivalent bidder in the no-
resale treatment.  These differences range from a maximum of $0.70 at a signal of approximately 
$20.00 to a minimum of $-0.56 at a signal of approximately $46.00.  
Experimental Results 
Table 5 provides summary statistics for the experimental data.  Entries in Table 5 are at 
the period level and include average bid level and its standard deviation, the average winning bid 
and its standard deviation, and the average resale price.  Table 5 can be read as follows: on 
average, in period 1 of the No Resale treatment, subjects submit a bid of $20.84 (standard 
deviation = 9.32) and the average winning bid is $30.77 (standard deviation = 3.17).  Perusal of 
the data summary in Table 5 leads to our first two results: 
Result 1:  Bids in a first-price auction followed by resale exchange in an OA continuation 
game are greater than those submitted in equivalent markets without resale. 
 
                                                 
12 The optimal bid functions were derived numerically.  The algorithm is available upon request. 
 Result 2: Bids in a first-price auction followed by resale exchange in an OA continuation 
game are greater than those submitted in equivalent markets with an EA continuation game. 
 
These results can be seen most directly by examining both per period average and winning bids 
across our three laboratory treatments.  Across each of the ten market periods, both average and 
winning bids in the resale treatment with OA continuation game are greater than bids in both the 
baseline (no resale) treatment and the resale treatment with EA continuation game.   
Our last piece of evidence to support Results 1 and 2 comes from a random effects bid 
equation of the following form: 
  Bit = Zitβ+ it,                                      (5) 
where Bit is the bid of the ith buyer in period t.  Vector Zit includes treatment dummy variables, 
the induced signal received by the agent and to maintain consistency with our theory the square 
of the signal.  Session fixed effects are also included, and we model it = i + uit; E[i] = 0, 
E[i
2] = 
2, E[ij] = 0 for i  j; i and uit are orthogonal for all i and t.  The random effects i 
capture important heterogeneity across agents that would be left uncontrolled in a standard cross-
sectional model. 
Column A in Table 6 presents regression results which provide support for our first two 
results.  For example, parameter estimates in column A suggest that average bids in the OA 
treatment are $5.85 higher than average bids in the baseline treatment (the omitted categorical 
variable) with this difference statistically significant at the p < .05 level.  Furthermore, using a 
Chow test of coefficient equality, we find that OA bids are larger than EA bids at the p < .05 
level.  As column B of Table 6 shows, these differences are robust across empirical 
specifications that allow the treatment effects to differ over lower (higher) ranges of the signal 
space – i.e., over signals less than (greater than) $26.00.     Empirical results in Table 5 suggest that baseline bids and EA treatment bids are 
isomorphic.  Yet, when bids are analyzed over ranges of signals less than (greater than) $26, 
where our theory hypothecates that bids from the EA treatment are greater than (less than) those 
submitted in the baseline treatment, we find evidence consonant with the theory.  Over lower 
ranges of the signal space, bids from the EA treatment are $2.73 larger than those from the 
baseline treatment, a statistically significant difference at the p < 0.05 level.
13  Over higher 
ranges of the signal space, bids from the EA treatment average $2.07 less than those from the 
baseline treatment, with these differences statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level.  These 
data patterns lead to the next result: 
Result 3:  Over lower (higher) signal ranges, bidders in a first-price auction followed by an 
EA continuation game submit bids that are higher (lower) than those submitted by agents in 
an equivalent baseline market without resale opportunity.  
 
Empirical estimates in Table 6 provide regression results which highlight this result.  For 
example, parameter estimates from Column A suggest that over the entire signal domain, there is 
little discernable difference between bids – the estimate on the indicator for our EA treatment is 
not significant at any meaningful level.  However, when we examine behavior over different 
ranges of the signal space, as in Column B, we observe significant differences across our EA and 
baseline treatments.  Over lower ranges of the signal space, bids from the EA treatment are 
approximately $2.38 greater than the bids from our baseline auction markets.  And, at a higher 
range of the signal space, the bids from the EA treatment are approximately $2.08 less than the 
average bids from our baseline market.  Both of these differences are statistically significant at 
the p < 0.05 level using a Chow test of coefficient equality. 
Departures from Risk Neutral Predictions: The Role of Risk Aversion 
                                                 
13 Statistical significance is evaluated using the Mann-Whitney test of significance evaluated at the session level.  
These are demanding exercises since test statistics are based upon a comparison of average bid levels for signals less 
than (greater than) $26 in each of our six EA sessions versus comparable averages from our six baseline sessions.      Having found support that bidders respond to changes in the option value conveyed by 
resale, we now examine more closely the predictions of the theory.  Figure 2 provides an 
illustration of average bids (by signal) in our baseline no-resale market relative to the theoretical 
predictions for risk-neutral equilibrium bids.  As can be seen from the figure, risk-neutral point 
predictions do not fit the data well.  Over lower ranges of the signal space, realized bids are less 
than the risk-neutral theoretical predictions while over higher ranges, realized bids are greater 
than risk-neutral theoretical benchmarks.  Similar patterns, albeit less pronounced, arise in 
Figures 3 and 4 which plot average bids (by signal) for both the OA and EA treatments 
This raises two important questions for evaluating bidder behavior in auction markets.  
First, to what extent can such behavior be explained by the underlying risk preference of 
bidders?  There has been considerable debate over the ability of traditional theory to account for 
observed patterns of bidding in experimental first-price, private value auctions.
14  A number of 
studies have attempted to recover and infer the level of risk-aversion that rationalizes the 
observed bids of subjects in controlled laboratory environments (i.e., Cox and Oaxaca (1995); 
Cox et al. (1985); Goeree et al. (2002)).  In this study, we take a different route and directly elicit 
individual measures of risk posture and use this information as a control in estimating observed 
bidding behavior.  As such, we are able to correlate differences in observed bids with variations 
in risk preference across agents.
15    
Second, to what extent is the coherence of hypothesis tests affected by the specification 
of underlying bidder risk preference?  Lange et al. (2004) develop a theoretical model which 
highlights that the effect of resale on bidding strategies is attenuated by risk aversion.   
                                                 
14 See Kagel (1995) for an overview of this debate. 
15 Of course, unlike our experimental treatments risk posture should not be regarded as something we can 
exogenously impose on subjects.  Thus, we exercise caution when interpreting the data in that risk posture could be 
systematically related to individual-specific unobservables that cause the data patterns discussed below.  Incorrectly assuming the risk-preference of agents can thus impact the magnitude of estimated 
resale effects.   
  To evaluate the impact of risk preference on observed bids, we augment equation (5) by 
including an interaction of an individual’s risk preference with his/her signal, the signal squared, 
and the treatment dummies.
16   Empirical estimates from this model are contained in column C of 
Table 6.  We obtain the following insight from these results: 
Result 4: Over all but the lowest range of signals, risk-averse agents submit bids that are 
greater than their risk-neutral counterparts, with this difference increasing in the level of 
individual risk-aversion. 
 
Support for Result 4 can be garnered by examining the marginal effect of our risk proxy on 
realized bids.  For example, in Column C of Table 6 the estimated marginal effect of risk 
preference on realized bids in the baseline treatment is given by [-2.94 + 0.20*Signal – 
0.002*Signal
2].  This marginal effect is strictly positive for any signal greater than $15.  For any 
signal greater than $15 in the baseline treatment, the bid of a risk-averse agent should exceed that 
of a risk neutral counterpart receiving the same induced signal.  Similar patterns arise for both 
the EA and OA treatments.  In the EA (OA) treatment, risk-averse agents submit bids that are 
greater than a risk-neutral counterpart for any signal above $19 ($21).  Our data thus suggest a 
direct correlation between over-bidding and individual risk preference.   
Having found evidence that risk-aversion is correlated with observed patterns of bidding 
in our auctions, we now turn to examining the influence of individual risk preference on our 
estimated treatment effects.  Our theoretical model suggests that increased risk aversion serves to 
                                                 
16 To proxy each agent’s risk posture, we use the number of safe choices “Lottery A” selected by the agent in the 
Holt-Laury experimental design.  An increase in the number of safe choices represents an increase in the 
individual’s implied risk posture.  For example, an agent who selects option A for the first four choice occasions is 
considered risk neutral whereas an agent who selects option A for the first six choice options has CARA risk 
preference of approximately 0.5.  Figure 5 provides the frequency distribution of the implied CARA preference (by 
treatment) for the 90 subjects in our experiment auctions. attenuate the effect of resale.  Empirical support for this conjecture follows from a comparison of 
estimated treatment effects in model specifications that control for individual risk preference 
(Columns C and D) with those that do not condition behavior on risk preference (Column A).   
For example, the estimated treatment effect on the OA dummy variable is at least $7.21 greater 
in models that explicitly control for individual risk preference with this difference statistically 
significant at the p < 0.05 level.  Hence failing to account for individual risk posture, will tend to 
underestimate the impact of resale opportunities on observed bids.     
  The above discussion treats risk posture as if it is homogenous across agents.  However, 
subjects in our experiment and in many other settings demonstrate heterogeneities in risk 
posture.  An important question is thus how such variations affect the observed behavior of 
agents.  To address this issue, we calculate the average risk preference for subjects in each 
session and augment equation (5) by including an interaction of the average risk preference with 
induced signal and an interaction of these values with a measure of individual risk preference.  
Empirical estimates from this model are contained in column D in Table 6.  We obtain the 
following insight from these results: 
Result 5:  Bids are decreasing (increasing) in the average risk posture of competitors over 
lower (higher) ranges of signals.  
 
Although we are unaware of any theoretical model that examines heterogeneous risk 
posture in auctions with resale, Result 5 is consistent with intuition.  Over lower ranges of 
signals, bids of opponents are decreasing in their level of risk-aversion. Responding to this, an 
individual can also decrease his bids. Over higher signal ranges, however, an increased risk-
aversion of opponents leads to increased bids. Faced with such a more competitive environment, 
an individual might react by also increasing his bids.  Support for Result 5 is gained by examining the marginal effect of average risk 
preference at the session level (Mean Risk) on realized bids.  For example, in column D of Table 
6, the estimated marginal effect of mean risk on realized bids is given by: 
1.61 0.12 0.01 _
_
NR bid
Signal Ind Risk Signal
Mean Risk

     

 
which is positive for any induced signal greater than twenty for a risk-neutral agent – i.e., an 
agent who selects Option A in the Holt-Laury experiment for the first four choice occasions.  In 
fact, for any agent who selects Option A fewer than nine times, this expression is positive over 
some range of the induced signal space. 
Departures from Theoretical Benchmarks: The Role of Speculation 
  Having explored the role of risk posture on departures from theoretical benchmarks, we 
now examine whether resale possibilities introduce speculative motives that could explain 
observed over-bidding.  Across all three of our experimental treatments, only those bidders 
receiving the highest signal in a particular round should win an auction.  Table 7 explores this 
conjecture by summarizing the frequency with which the winning bid is submitted by those who 
received signal of different rank order.  As noted in Table 6, the bidder who receives the highest 
signal in our baseline treatment wins 80 percent of all auctions.  In contrast, such bidder wins 
only 51.7 percent (43.3 percent) of the auctions in our corresponding OA (EA) treatment.  This 
leads to a final result: 
Result 6:  Resale introduces speculative motives for bidding.  Bidders receiving the highest 
signal (lower ordered signals) are less (more) likely to win auctions in treatments with 
resale.    
 
Statistical support for Result 6 is contained in Table 8 which examines the likelihood with which 
bidders that receive the highest (Column A) or lower ordered (Column B) signals win our auctions.  As noted in Column A, the bidder with the highest signal is significantly less likely to 
win an auction when we introduce resale possibilities organized by either an OA or EA 
continuation game of complete information.  In contrast, bidders that receives lower ordered 
signals are significantly more likely to win an auction in these treatments than are counterparts in 
our baseline, no resale treatment.                          
V. Conclusions 
Auctions are ubiquitous.  Yet whether and to what extent the introduction of secondary 
resale markets influences bidding behavior when private values are uncertain remains largely 
unknown.  We begin by exploring a novel data set that provides insights into the importance of 
the resale effect.  Reduced-form empirical estimates suggest that bidding patterns are consistent 
with theoretical predictions.  Yet, akin to many empirical exercises with naturally-occurring data, 
the strength of inference is attenuated when one considers the set of maintained assumptions 
needed to generate confident conclusions from these data.    
Our approach to this problem is to make use of a laboratory experiment.  Such an effort 
gives up much of the realism associated with field data, but it permits us to investigate whether 
the resale market by itself can lead to such predicted consequences.  We find that extant theory 
has considerable predictive power, but the accuracy of the theory is enhanced if we control for 
individual risk preferences.  Besides their obvious importance normatively, these results have 
practical policy significance as well.  For example, a necessary condition to lift the 
countervailing duty and anti-dumping ruling against Canadian softwood lumber exporters (who 
export to the U.S.) is that their auction markets be robust and not influenced unduly by collusion.  
Without a proper understanding of the resale opportunities of the various bidders, the modeler may very well earmark bidding disparities among certain bidder types as evidence of collusion 
when it is in fact due merely to secondary market considerations.   
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  All Data  Loggers Only  Mills Only 












LSPI  115.23 114.91 119.75 
DC  1.48 1.48 1.47 
VPH_1000  0.27 0.27 0.28 
NCV_1000  8.99 9.03 8.45 
Slope  16.10 15.78 20.58 
LNVPT  -0.79 -0.80 -0.71 
Bwdn  0.02 0.02 0.01 
Burn  0.01 0.01 0.02 
Cy  0.07 0.06 0.10 
Horse  0.07 0.07 0.01 













Distance in km from 
Plot 
150.22 149.67 163.76 
Note:  Cell entries are mean values for the various covariates included in our regression models.  Associated 
standard deviations are in parentheses.     
 Table 2: Random Effects Regression Estimates: Interior SBFEP Auction Data 
 Model  (1) 
Only Bid in 
Cat 1 or 2 
Model (1) 
Only Bid in 


































































































































































   




   
       
Buyer Random 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Firms  1245  683  1245  1105  140 
# of Obs  5524  4325  5524  5148  376 
Log  Likelihood  -20537.2 -20423.5 -19632.7 -18225.7  -1371.3 
       






** (*) Denotes statistical significance at the p < 0.05 (p <.10) level; Cell entries provide parameter estimates for a 
linear random effects regression with the associated standard errors in parentheses.  











Resale – OA Continuation: 




Resale – EA Continuation: 





Notes:  Each cell represents one unique treatment in which we gathered data in different sessions.  
For example, “NR” in row 1, column 2, denotes that the no-resale treatment had 30 subjects in 
groups of 5 competing in auction markets where ex post resale of the commodity was prohibited.  
No subject participated in more than one treatment.  
 
 


























































































































































































Notes:  Each cell entry represents the signal received by the bidder in a given period and her induced use value (in 
parentheses).  For example, buyer #1 received a signal of $36.00 and an induced use value of $29.00 in market 
period 1 (column 2, row 2).  Each buyer received the high signal in 2 of the market periods and the high use value in 
2 of the market periods.  In five of the market periods (4, 5, 6, 8, and 9) we would ex ante predict resale exchange, as 
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N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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$36 $36 $37 $37 $38 $39 $39 $39 $40 $40 
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$29 $33 $34 $32 $32 $34 $34 $33 $33 $34 
            
Note: Entries in the table provide mean performance measures across our three experimental treatments.  The data 
are summarized by period and can be read as follows: in period 1 of the No Resale treatment the average bid was 
$20.84 with a standard deviation of $9.32.  The average winning bid for the round was $30.77 with a standard 
deviation of $3.17. Table 6: Random Effects Regression – Lab Bid Levels 
 Model  A 
  





















EA Treatment and Signal < $26.00    2.38** 
(1.06) 
  
OA Treatment and Signal < $26.00    8.47** 
(1.06) 
  
NR Treatment and Signal ≥ $26.00    12.69** 
(0.74) 
  
EA Treatment and Signal ≥ $26.00    10.61** 
(1.08) 
  
OA Treatment and Signal ≥ $26.00    15.70** 
(1.08) 
  




















    -0.01** 
(0.005) 
Individual Risk      -2.94** 
(0.33) 
 
MeanRisk       -1.61* 
(0.96) 
        
Period  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Bidder Random Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
#  of  Bidders  90 90 90 90 
        
Number of Observations  900  900  900  900 
        
Sigma_U 2.51  3.06  4.49  3.24 
Sigma_E 7.93  6.26  5.65  5.32 
Log  Likelihood  -3171.53 -2983.21 -2924.98 -2851.86 
** Denotes statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level 
* Denotes statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level 
 
Note: Cell entries indicate the marginal effect of model covariates (see text for description of covariates) on 
recorded bid level.  For example, in row 2 of Column A the estimated marginal effect of being in the OA treatment 
is an increase of $5.85 on bids, ceteris paribus.   Table 7: Signal and Bid Order – All Rounds 










No Resale       
Highest Signal  80%  18.3%  1.7%  0%  0% 
2
nd Highest Signal  13.3%  46.7%  26.7%  10%  3.3% 
3
rd Highest Signal  6.7%  26.7%  55%  8.3%  3.3% 
4
th Highest Signal  0%  6.7%  11.7%  50%  31.7% 
Lowest Signal  0%  1.7%  5%  31.7%  61.7% 
OA Treatment       
Highest Signal  51.7%  25%  13.3%  8.3%  1.7% 
2
nd Highest Signal  20%  31.7%  16.7%  21.7%  10% 
3
rd Highest Signal  11.7%  21.7%  33.3%  21.7%  11.7% 
4
th Highest Signal  11.7%  8.3%  23.3%  28.3%  28.3% 
Lowest Signal  5%  13.3%  13.3%  20%  48.3% 
EA Treatment       
Highest Signal  43.3%  31.7%  13.3%  5%  6.7% 
2
nd Highest Signal  30%  28.3%  21.7%  11.7%  8.3% 
3
rd Highest Signal  15%  20%  31.7%  23.3%  10% 
4
th Highest Signal  10%  11.7%  23.3%  31.7%  23.3% 
Lowest Signal  1.7%  8.3%  10%  28.3%  51.7% 
Note:  Cell entries are frequencies and can be read as follows – in our baseline treatment the bidder with the highest 
signal submits the highest bid 80% of the time.  
  
Table 8: Signal Order and the Likelihood of Winning the Auction 
  Probability of Winning  Probability of Winning 












    
Signal Order  Highest Signal Only  2
nd Highest to Lowest Signal 
Session Random Effects  Yes  Yes 
    
# of Observations  180  720 
Log Likelihood  -115.04  -239.7 
** Denotes statistical significance at the p < 0.01 level 
 
Note:  Cell entries are parameter estimates from a random effects probit model examining the factors that influence 
the likelihood of submitting the winning bid.  Standard errors are in parentheses.   Column A restricts the sample to 
only those bidders who received the highest signal in the auction.  Column B restricts the sample to only those 
bidders who received higher order signals – i.e., the second highest to the lowest signal.  
Figure 1: Risk-Neutral Predictions for Bids 
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Figure 3: Average Bid by Signal – OA Treatment 
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EAAppendix A: Experimental Instructions – OA Resale Treatment 
 
Welcome to Lister’s Auctions!  You have the opportunity to bid in a series of experimental 
auctions today and you can earn cash by participating.   
 
Auction Rules: 
In this auction you will bid against four (4) other people and the person with the highest bid is 
the winner, and pays the amount of their bid for the “fictitious” commodity.  The auction is a 
sealed bid auction so you don’t know the bids of the other participants.  We will repeat the 
auction for 10 rounds.  At the end of the session, your earnings from this experiment and another 
unrelated experiment will be summed and paid to you in cash.  
 
There are six steps in the auction process, each of which is explained in detail below.  The six 
steps include: (i) determining your signal of the value of the fictitious commodity, (ii) 
determining your bid, (iii) determining your use value for the fictitious good, (iv) determining 
the winner, (v) the resale market, and (vi) determining your payouts for the round. 
 
1.  Determining your signal of the good’s value:  At the beginning of each period, a 
monitor will hand you a card numbered from zero dollars ($0) to fifty dollars ($50) in one 
dollar ($1) increments.  The value on the card handed to you will be a signal of your use 
value for the fictitious good.  The other bidders in your auction will have their signals 
determined in exactly the same way.  Signals are private and independent across buyers, and 
your signal will change across rounds.   
 
Signals and Use Values 
 
Use values, V, in each round are drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval [10, 
40].  That is, every dollar value between 10 and 40 is equally likely to be drawn as your 
use value.  These values are independently drawn for each subject and will differ across 
periods. 
 
The signal you will receive is determined by adding a random number drawn on the 
interval [-10, 10] to your use value.  Again, each dollar value between -10 and 10 is 
equally likely to be drawn and added to your use value.  Your first-stage signal, S, is 
hence given by: 
 
number random V S      
 
Your signal, S, is thus distributed on the interval [$0, $50].   
 
Given your signal, you can compute the expected use value.  For example, if you were to 
receive a signal of $30 in the first stage, you know that your final use value must lie 
somewhere in the interval [$20, $40].  Since each of these values is equally likely to have 
been selected as your use value, on average your use value is $30.  However, any value in 
this range could have been assigned as your use value.   
 2.  Determining your bid value:  After receiving your signal, you will choose your bid 
value for the fictitious good.  In order to choose your bid, consider how your earnings for 
each period are calculated.  If you are the person with the highest bid you are the winner of 
the auction.  Your earnings are equal to your use value minus your bid amount if you have 
the highest end use value: 
 
Earnings = your good’s use value (V) – your bid 
 
If you are the person with the highest bid but do not have the highest use value, your earnings 
are equal to the highest use value of all participants minus your bid amount: 
 
Earnings = highest use value – your bid 
 
If you are not the high bidder in a round, your earnings for the period are zero.  If there is a 
tie, the winner will be determined by the flip of a coin (if more than two people tie we will 
draw a card to determine the winner).  Your bid can be any amount in the range from zero 
($0) to forty dollars ($40) in ten cent ($0.10) increments.   
 
3.  Determining your use value:  Once all bids have been received, a monitor will hand you 
a second slip of paper numbered from ten dollars ($10) to forty dollars ($40) that gives your 
final use value, V.  Your use value will lie within  10 $  of your signal, S.   
 
4.  Determining the auction winner:  All bids will be publicly announced and recorded by a 
monitor on the blackboard.  Your bid will be compared with those of the four other 
participants in the auction.  The person with the highest bid amount is the winner. 
 
5.  The resale market: In the resale market, each participant can see the use values for all 
other participants.  The highest bidder in the auction market will sell the “fictitious” 
commodity to the individual with the highest use value.  In this experiment this happens 
automatically.  The payoff for the winner is the highest use value of all participants minus 
his/her bid amount.  If you did not win the auction, your payout for the period will be zero.  
The payout for the auction winner can be positive even if your bid was greater than your use 
value.      
 
6.  Determining your payouts:  If you are the auction winner, you will receive the 
difference between the highest use value and your bid.  If you did not win the auction, you 
receive zero for that period.  Your total earnings for this experiment are the sum of your 
earnings for each of the 10 periods.   
 
Do you have any questions about the auction process?   Appendix B: Experimental Instructions for Risk Aversion Experiment 
 
  Record your subject number from the previous part on your decision sheet. Your 
decision sheet shows ten decisions listed on the left.  Each decision is a paired choice between 
OPTION A and OPTION B.  You will make ten choices and record these in the final column, 
but only one of them will be used in the end to determine your earnings.  Before you start 
making your ten choices, please let me explain how these choices will affect your earnings for 
this part of the experiment. 
  We will use part of a deck of cards to determine payoffs; cards 2-10 and the Ace will 
represent “1”.  After you have made all of your choices, we will randomly select a card twice, 
once to select one of the ten decisions to be used, and a second time to determine what your 
payoff is for the option you chose, A or B, for the particular decision selected. (After the first 
card is selected, it will be put back in the pile, the deck will be reshuffled, and the second card 
will be drawn.)  Even though you will make ten decisions, only one of these will end up 
affecting your earnings, but you will not know in advance which decision will be used.   
Obviously, each decision has an equal chance of being used in the end. 
  Now, please look at Decision 1 at the top.  OPTION A pays $2.00 if the Ace is selected, 
and it pays $1.60 if the card selected is 2-10.  OPTION B yields $3.85 if the Ace is selected, 
and it pays $0.10 if the card selected is 2-10.  The other decisions are similar, except that as you 
move down the table, the chances of the higher payoff for each option increase.  In fact, for 
Decision 10 in the bottom row, the cards will not be needed since each option pays the highest 
payoff for sure, so your choice here is between $2.00 or $3.85. 
  To summarize, you will make ten choices: for each decision row you will have to 
choose between OPTION A and OPTION B.  You may choose A for some decision rows and B 
for other rows, and you may change your decisions and make them in any order.  When you are 
finished, we will come to your desk and pick a card to determine which of the ten decisions will 
be used.  Then we will put the card back in the deck, shuffle, and select a card again to 
determine your money earnings for the OPTION you chose for that decision.  Earnings for this 
choice will be added to your previous earnings, and you will be paid all earnings in cash when 
we finish. 
  So now please look at the empty boxes on the right side of the record sheet.  You will 
have to write a decision, A or B in each of these boxes, and then the card selection will 
determine which one is going to count.  We will look at the decision that you made for the 
choice that counts, and circle it, before selecting a card again to determine your earnings for this 
part.  Then you will write your earnings in the blank at the bottom of the page. 
  Are there any questions?  Now you may begin making your choices.  Please do not talk 
with anyone else while we are doing this; raise your hand if you have a question. 
 
 